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ANTITRUST*
The Tenth Circuit decided several interesting antitrust cases
this term involving questions of territorial restrictions, tying arrangements,' proof of market power and relevant market, proof
of resultant damages, and the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act.'
In World of Sleep, Inc. v. Stearns & Foster Co.,3 the Tenth
Circuit applied the rule "that an essential element for [private]
recovery under the antitrust laws is that the claimant be injured
or damaged, and a violation of the Act without resultant injury
is not enough." 4 Stearns began selling bed products to Denverbased World of Sleep in 1965 under an informal business relationship, with neither party committed to a formal agreement.
Stearns had a policy, with some exceptions, of selling to only one
dealer in a given locality. In 1968 World of Sleep expanded and
opened a sister store in Atlanta, Georgia. Steams refused to sell
merchandise to the Atlanta World of Sleep store, citing its loyalty
to a local department store. The World of Sleep store in Denver
began transshipping Stearns' products to its Atlanta store, and,
upon learning of this, Stearns terminated all sales to World of
Sleep. World of Sleep instituted a civil antitrust action alleging
that Stearns violated the Sherman Act 5 by imposing territorial
restrictions on the resale of Stearns' products. World of Sleep
requested a directed verdict on the issue of liability and asked
that the jury determine only the amount of damages. The trial
court refused this motion; the jury returned a verdict for Steams
finding no antitrust violation.
In Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (1977), the United States
Supreme Court overruled the per se rule of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967). The impact of this decision should be considered on the analyses of World
of Sleep v. Stearns & Foster Co. and Randy's Studebaker Sales v. Nissan Motor Corp.
infra-Ed.
Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912
(1976). The case involved a novel, but unsuccessful, attempt to classify the Shell trademark and Shell gasoline as separate products in an illegal tying arrangement. For a more
extended analysis of this decision, see the Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights Overview
infra.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1970) [hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as the Franchise Act].
525 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 43.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Sherman Act].
*
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World of Sleep argued on appeal that United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.' should have been controlling on the issue
of whether there had been a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
Discussing the holding in Schwinn, the Tenth Circuit stated:
In Schwinn, it was held that where a manufacturer, such as Steams
in the instant case, sells his product to a distributor, such as World
of Sleep, and in connection with such sale, "firmly and resolutely"
subjects the distributor to territorial restrictions upon resale,
whether by "explicit agreement or silent combination or understanding with his vendee," a per se violation of the Sherman Act
results.'

The Tenth Circuit held that Steams' discontinuance of sales because of World of Sleep's transshipping did not necessarily establish that Stearns had previously imposed territorial restrictions
on the resale of its products; therefore, the issue of liability had
properly gone to the jury.'
The theory of damages proposed by World of Sleep was
firmly rejected by the Tenth Circuit. World of Sleep argued that
when Stearns terminated sales it became necessary to increase
the advertising of its other lines of bedding. The court found that
no direct relationship could be established between Steams' alleged territorial restrictions and the increased advertising expenses, especially since World of Sleep's sales and net worth had also
increased yearly. The court noted that the proximate damage
problem alone could have justified the trial court's decision to
deny the motion for a directed verdict
In E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 01 E.J. Delaney
388 U.S. 365 (1967). In Schwinn, a bicycle manufacturer assigned territories to each
of its 22 distributors and instructed the distributors to sell only to franchised accounts in
their own territories.
1 525 F.2d at 44 (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967)).
1 The trial court had instructed the jury on what constituted a per se violation of the
Sherman Act in accordance with the Schwinn holding. 525 F.2d at 44. Given the admitted
policy of Steams to sell to only one dealer in a locality, the warnings given to World of
Sleep concerning transshipping, and the ultimate discontinuance of all sales to World of
Sleep, query what would constitute a per se violation sufficient to warrant a directed
verdict.
1 525 F.2d at 43. Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages
in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 231 (1961).

The court's damages analysis is more convincing than its attempt to distinguish Schwinn
from the present case.
10525 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
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Corporation, an advertising-promotional firm, alleged that Bonne
Bell, a manufacturer of cosmetics exclusively endorsed by the
United States Ski Team," had violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act'" by conspiring to prevent the distribution of
"skier's paks" containing cosmetics.' 3 At trial, the jury awarded
damages to Bonne Bell.'4 The Tenth Circuit found on appeal that
the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that section 1 had
been violated, but held that a prima facie showing of a section 2
violation had not been made. Because the jury had returned a
general verdict, the case was reversed and remanded for a new
trial.' 5
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the facts supporting the allegation of a section 1 violation: Bonne Bell had initiated a "total
involvement" program in the ski cosmetic market; by 1970,
Bonne Bell believed it had a "hold" on that market; Bonne Bell
was opposed to all competition within that market; and although
the USSA was initially enthusiastic about Delaney's proposal,
after Bonne Bell's objections were raised the USSA refused the
proposal." The court held that, although Bonne Bell's exclusive
" Bonne Bell entered into a contract with the United States Ski Association [USSA]
in which the United States Ski Team [Ski Team] exclusively endorsed Bonne Bell's
cosmetic products, with Bonne Bell designated the official cosmetic of the Ski Team.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... " Id. (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) provides in part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
...
Id. (emphasis added).
1 E.J. Delaney Corporation [Delaney] was organized to bring advertising from national advertisers to the market in ski resort areas. Delaney began distributing its advertisers' products in a "skier's pak" which included cosmetics and toiletries; a set fee was paid
to Delaney by each supplier for every "pak" sold. In 1970, the USSA was contacted by
Delaney, and initial approval, subject to final approval by the USSA auditors, was given
to a plan which provided that each "pak" sell for one dollar and that 40% of the total
receipts be given to the Ski Team.
11The trial court trebled the damages and awarded attorneys' fees as authorized
under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
11525 F.2d at 301. See Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Village Theater, Inc., 228
F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1955).
IS 525 F.2d at 301. Bonne Bell's objections were premised on the concept that the
distribution of the "paks" and the advertisement of the Ski Team's receipt of net proceeds
would be suggestive of USSA's endorsement and not in accord with the exclusive endorsement contract.
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endorsement contract with USSA was not illegal per se, 17 the jury
could reasonably have concluded from the evidence that Bonne
Bell utilized the endorsement contract in an illegal conspiracy in
restraint of trade violative of section 1.
The trial court had proceeded on the theory that the jury
could find a section 2 violation based upon a finding of "a dangerous probability of monopolization . . . even absent specific proof
of Bonne Bell's market power."'" The Tenth Circuit disagreed,
stating:
[ln the absence of any showing by the plaintiff as to where the area
of competition existed, or what clout the defendant corporation had
therein, it was error for the trial judge to submit the §2 issue to the
jury. No facts were before it upon which to base a verdict, and no
facts from which inferences could properly be drawn."

The Tenth Circuit began its analysis of the section 2 claim
by reviewing the cases setting forth the established liberal rule for
accepting minimal proof of damage in an antitrust case, quoting
the United States Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. :20 "[The] burden of proving the fact of damage . . .is satisfied by proof of some damage flowing from the
point goes
unlawful conspiracy; inquiry beyond this minimum
12
'
damage."
of
fact
the
not
and
amount
only to the
Despite this language in Zenith and an admission by the
court that Delaney had "incurred some sales and distribution
losses, ' 22 the Tenth Circuit was able to distinguish the present
issue from that discussed in Zenith:
The critical problem here does not involve a question of proof
of damage made at trial or how the damages may be proved. Rather,
it is a basic matter of proof of a cause of action, or, more particularly, proof of a prima facie case to go to the jury.Y
17 Id.
"
Id. at 300. Attempting to monopolize is a violation of section 2. The "attempt"
clause has produced interpretation problems for the lower federal courts not found in
section 2's monopolization and conspiracy prohibitions. For an excellent discussion of the
exact problem presented in this case, see Note, Attempt to Monopolize Under the Sherman Act: Defendant's Market Power as a Requisite to a Prima Facie Case, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 1451 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1451].
" 525 F.2d at 306.
395 U.S. 100 (1969) (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 114 n.9.
22 525 F.2d at 307.
Id. at 306.
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In so formulating the issue, the Tenth Circuit required two
elements of proof to establish a prima facie case for attempted
monopolization violative of section 2: (1) proof of specific intent
to monopolize; and (2) proof of market power or market position
(with a definition of the relevant market).4 The Supreme Court
has long required proof of specific intent to monopolize,25 but has
not yet expressly recognized the necessity of proving a defendant's market power. The Tenth Circuit joined a growing number of lower federal courts which now require proof of market
power in a section 2 claim for attempted monopolization. 7
The Tenth Circuit commented on the lack of evidence concerning Bonne Bell's market power:
z' Id. at 305-06.
E.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
26 For a discussion of the need for clarification by the Supreme Court, see 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 1451. The author suggests:
Given the premise that attempt to monopolize should include a broad category of single-firm coercive activity, the focus should be on economic rather
than market power. Any and all forms of economic power are relevant here,
for the concept of attempt does not necessarily require a degree of market
power in the field where monopolization is sought. . . . Relevant considerations might include: a deep pocket, either defendant's or a parent corporation's; control over demand, distribution or supply; a dominant position in
a separate market; reciprocal arrangements with a sibling in a conglomerate
family; or patents, copyrights or exclusive contract rights. All are capable of
giving a defendant firm sufficient leverage to implement a predatory scheme,
and all are analytically independent of market power in the area of competition in which injury is inflicted.
Id. at 1474 (footnotes omitted).
The Tenth Circuit noted that Delaney had established that:
Bonne Bell had the economic power to become the official cosmetic of the
U.S. Ski Team; that it had the economic power to pay the USSA over
$180,000.00 in minimum retainers . . . [and] that it believed that it had
the economic power to develop a "hold" on the skiers' cosmetic market in
the United States ....
525 F.2d at 306-07 (emphasis added). However these facts were found insufficient to
establish defendant's requisite market power.
" The court cited cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits
as supporting the view that proof of market power is necessary to establish a prima facie
claim for attempt to monopolize. 525 F.2d at 305. The Third Circuit, in Coleman Motor
Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975), has also adopted this requirement.
The Ninth Circuit appears to be split in its view as to whether market power is important
in attempt cases. Compare Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964) (relevant market held irrelevant) with Cornwell Quality Tools
Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1971) ("sufficient market power to come dangerously close" to monopolization was an element of proof in an attempt claim).
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The record, as to this element, shows only that there were at the
time some five million skiers in the country who were affluent and
youthful; that the market was sought after, and that there were
unique marketing problems. This was all that was shown as to the
market as such. There was no evidence offered as to the corporate
defendant's sales volume in the "skier's cosmetic market" nor the
sales volume therein of anyone else. There was no evidence as to the
total sales in the market. There was no evidence as to the corporate
defendant's power as to pricing or as to any other party's power.n

This lack of evidence was a fatal defect in the establishment of a
prima facie case against Bonne Bell for attempted monopolization.2
Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. 0 involved allegations by an automobile dealer in Salt Lake City
[Randy's] against the distribution of Datsun vehicles [Nissan]
for violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 3' and for

violations of the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act. 32 Randy's alleged that Nissan refused to renew the franchise because Randy's
would not follow Nissan's resale price maintenance policies.
Randy's also argued that Nissan deliberately attempted to drive
Randy's out of business by supplying an insufficient number of
Datsun vehicles. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Randy's
under the Franchise Act, but found in favor of Nissan on the
Sherman Act claims.
In upholding the jury verdict, the Tenth Circuit noted that
"[tihe Franchise Act gives to an automobile dealer a federal
cause of action against an automobile manufacturer who fails to
act in good faith in performing or complying with any of the terms
or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, cancelling, or not
renewing the franchise.

'33 The

Franchise Act defines "good faith"

as the duty of the dealer and manufacturer "to act in a fair and
equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one
party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion
" 525 F.2d at 306 (emphasis in original).
The trial judge's instruction on relevant market was held to be a correct statement
of the law. However, since there was no evidence on relevant market, the issue should not
have been submitted to the jury. Id. at 308.
533 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1976).
2

15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
' The act is also popularly known as the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act.

11 533 F.2d at 514 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1970)).
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or intimidation from the other party. ' 34 The Franchise Act also
provides "[tihat recommendation, endorsement, exposition,
persuasion, urging or argument shall not be" considered lack of
good faith.3 5 Noting that the line between normal recommendation and coercion may indeed be thin, the Tenth Circuit examined the cases interpreting good faith under the Franchise Act
and found that Nissan's actions constituted bad faith. The court
cited a Second Circuit case3 and held that coercion and subsequent termination for failure to adhere to a manufacturer's suggested resale price constituted bad faith. The court cited Junikki
Imports, Inc. v. Toyota Motors37 for the proposition that bad faith
also exists when a manufacturer supplies an insufficient number
of cars in an attempt to drive a dealer out of business. With the
aid of these holdings the Tenth Circuit found "Nissan used the
nonrenewal weapon to coerce the dealer into a program of retail
price fixing. '38 Sufficient evidence was present to show that Nissan curtailed the supply of automobiles in order to bring about
price maintenance and suppression of competition. Additionally,
Nissan tried to force Randy's to make major capital improvements, which could be deemed an effort to force Randy's to raise
its prices to meet expenses. 3 The court held that projection of lost
profits over a ten-year period for loss of the franchise was not too
speculative for jury determination."
Nissan objected to the use of questionnaires submitted into
evidence by Randy's to show how the customers felt about the
quality of Randy's service. The court noted the recent tendency
to admit surveys of this kind if properly conducted 4' and held that
the surveys "were properly admitted to reflect the then existing
state of mind of the customers as to the quality of Randy's service
generally." 2
533 F.2d at 514 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1970)).
15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1970).
3, Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970).
37 335 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
533 F.2d at 516.
31

Id.

,o Id. at 518-19. See Note, The Elusive Measure of Damages for Wrongful Termination of Automobile Dealership Franchises, 74 YALE L.J. 354 (1964).
" 533 F.2d at 520.
42Id.
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In Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 3 the Tenth
Circuit upheld a jury verdict against Olson Farms, an egg distributor. The plaintiffs, fourteen egg producers some of whom were
also distributors, charged Olson Farms with conspiring with other
distributors to fix and depress the prices paid to producers. Plaintiffs also alleged that Olson Farms conspired with others to fix the
wholesale price for eggs. The jury was presented with a special
verdict form which set forth the three causes of action under the
Sherman Act: (1)a restraint of trade violation of section 1; (2) a
conspiracy to monopolize in violation of section 2; and (3) an
attempt to monopolize in violation of section 2.11
On appeal, Olson Farms first argued that there was insufficient evidence to warrant submission of the case to the jury,
suggesting that the only possible evidence showing price fixing
was the existence of price parallelism between the prices paid by
Olson Farms to egg producers and the prices paid by its named
coconspirators. The court agreed that price parallelism alone
would not establish a conspiracy to fix prices.4 5 However, price
parallelism becomes significant when it is accompanied by evidence of behavior to fix prices." There was sufficient evidence of
a course of conduct to fix prices to submit the issue to the jury.
Olson Farms also argued that there was insufficient evidence
to establish the relevant geographical market. The court noted
there was a difference of opinion as to what constituted the relevant geographic market47 and held that in this case it was best
for the trial judge to submit the issue to the jury. 8 The Tenth
43

541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976).

,1The jury found defendant violated all three claims. Damages were awarded to four
of the plaintiffs under claim (1). The remaining ten plaintiffs were awarded damages
under claim (2). No damages were awarded under claim (3). The plaintiffs also originally
alleged violations of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13c,
12a (1970) and the antitrust laws of Utah. However, these claims were withdrawn prior
to trial.
, 541 F.2d at 245.
,' Id. The court pointed to numerous telephone calls and meetings between Olson
Farms and the coconspirators, and to intracompany correspondence which permitted the
inference that Olson Farms was acting in concert with others to depress the prices paid
to the egg producers.
11Id. Olson Farms urged inclusion of Southern California in the market because from
time to time it served as a source of eggs when there was a shortage in Utah. Plaintiffs
argued that Utah and the southern part of Idaho constituted the geographic market.
1 It is interesting to note the ease with which the court was able to handle the
problem of relevant geographic market given the problems encountered in Delaney. How-
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Circuit also rejected Olson Farms' contention that there was no
damage to the egg producers. 9 The voluminous record from the
two month trial was such as to allow the jury to find and infer
that plaintiffs suffered legal injury. 0
Mark Wolfe
ever, the court seemed to imply that, during the two month jury trial in Olson Farms,
much evidence had been introduced by the parties concerning the relevant geographic
market, in stark contrast to what the court characterized as a total lack thereof in
Delaney.
4 The court held:
[Piroof of economic damage to their "business or property" is a necessary
precondition to their recovery of treble damages under the Clayton Act. ...
We think there was sufficient evidence of the fact that the plaintiffs did
sustain some damage since there was ample statistical data and expert testimony describing depressed producer prices and the necessary concomitant-lost profits. As to the quantum of damage, the plaintiffs were under
no burden to establish it with mathematical precision so long as the extent
of such damage was not left to jury speculation.
541 F.2d at 246 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
1 The opinion also resolves an apparent inconsistency in the verdicts returned by the
jury on the special verdict forms. Id. at 246-47.

